Abstract: Despite the provisions of the UNFCCC some developed countries, the United States in particular, are insistent that their actions are contingent on 'meaningful participation' by developing countries. This paper explores the developments -social and economic -in the South that would influence GHG emissions and identifies those developments that are essential to a long-term solution of the climate change problem. The paper argues that participation in project based activities, such as those defined by the CDM, may bring about short-term reductions in the rate of growth of GHG emissions. However, building the social infrastructure of developing economies is an essential precondition to facilitate their transition towards a situation wherein they could also undertake quantitative commitments towards climate-friendly development. Paradoxically, Official Development Assistance that would facilitate such a transition is on the decline.
Introduction
After a promising start at Rio in 1992 with 152 countries expressing their solidarity for protecting the earth's climate, the Climate Change debate, at the political level, seems to be languishing. The progress made towards establishing reductions in, or even intentions to reduce, the emissions of greenhouse gases has been significantly slower than the most modest expectations by any stakeholder. At the scientific level, uncertainties surrounding this phenomenon continue to prevail, although the Second Assessment report pointed out that "the balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on climate change". Unfortunately, the political debate seems to be progressing parallel and oblivious to, the changes in scientific understanding. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is commendably attempting to integrate some of the policy considerations into its technical and scientific reporting. Development, equity and sustainability (DES) are issues being viewed as important cross-cutting concerns, that need to be integrated into climate change analyses [1, 2] . It is in the context of these discussions that this paper attempts to outline the underlying concerns, and the factors determining development patterns in the South, and the implication of these for the climate change phenomenon.
The South: current situation
The South by implication means the set of developing countries. However, it needs to be borne in mind that this set itself is quite disparate and their socio-economic status varies considerably. However, for purposes of the climate change debate, this is a reasonable grouping to adopt -the South referring to the low and middle-income countries. The divide in this debate is that while the 'North' has had the luxury of time and resources to achieve prosperity, the 'South' needs the time and space to fulfil its developmental needs.
Developmental patterns in the past have further widened the North-South gap. On average, each year in the period 1960 to 1993 widened the absolute gap for middleincome countries by $169 and for the poor countries by $176 [3] . The mean annual expansion of the absolute gap for African countries was $1,682. The current comparisons between these groups of countries are given in Table 1 below. Low levels of income are also reflected in low levels of social infrastructure. Obviously, the priorities of the countries of the South would be to pursue faster development paths and equally obviously their contributions to emissions of GHGs have, thus far, been significantly lower than that of the North. The World Bank, in its World Development Report, 1998/99 [4] , realizes that "economies are built not merely through the accumulation of physical capital and human skill, but on a foundation of information, learning, and adaptation". If one looks at the fundamentals of learning (Table 2) it is obvious that countries of the South have to substantially strengthen their foundation in order to advance their social and economic well-being. 3 What would be the South's contribution to GHG emissions?
The contention of the countries of the North that, unless developing countries participate in addressing the problem of climate change, their own efforts would bear little fruit arises from the inevitability of higher GHG emissions from countries of the South. Higher population growth and expanding economies, it is expected, would increase emissions from developing countries to nearly half of global emissions by 2010 [5] . Under the Byrd resolution the US Senate categorically stated that it would not support a treaty that excludes developing nations from binding commitments and emission reduction targets. Given below are three sets of projections of GHG emissions from the developing countries under business-as-usual or reference scenarios.
EIA projections
In the reference case developing countries (DC's) would contribute to 45 % of carbon emissions while industrialized countries (ICs) would contribute to only 42 % and the rest would come from eastern European/former Soviet Union(EE/FSU). Asia would account for 74% of the DC emissions. In developing Asia, energy consumption would account for 28% of the total emissions. Coal is expected to remain the dominant fuel in the region -particularly in India and China -although it has the lowest growth rate of all three fossil fuels. Natural gas is expected to grow the fastest at 7.7% a year. The NICs and other developing countries in the region depend more on oil. In India and China, gas is growing at explosive rates of 11.1% and 9.3% respectively. In other regions, Central and South America would have the fastest growth in energy consumption at 3% a year during 1995-2015. During 1995-2015, electricity consumption is expected to grow at 2.2 % in ICs and 3.7 in the others (incl. EE/FSU) but at a particularly high rate in Asia at 5.2%.
Coal would remain the dominant fuel for power generation globally with slow growth in capacity in ICs offset by the rapid expansion in DC's particularly Asia. Both renewables and natural gas continue to grow as energy sources for power generation during 1995-2015. Use of natural gas in established markets is expected to rise, while in Asia and Central & South America major increments will be added to the demand.
Growth rate in oil consumption in the ICs would be about 1.1% as opposed to 3.5% in the DC's. The demand for oil would double during 1995-2015 with developing Asia becoming a dominant force.
World energy outlook [6,7]
ICs would account for 39% of carbon emissions in 2020 while DC's would account for 49% and EE/FSUs for 12%. Asia would contribute to 71% of the DC emissions. A regional analysis is presented in the following paragraphs.
OECD: Total primary energy demand is expected to grow at 1.1% in OECD Europe, which accounts for 15% of world energy demand. Total primary energy demand is expected to grow at 0.8% in OECD North America. Total primary energy demand is expected to grow at 1.2% in OECD Pacific.
China: Average annual growth rate of primary energy demand is expected to be 3.6% during the period and is lower than the historical rate of 5.5% . The share of coal declines by 10% and this demand is essentially for power generation. Share of oil increases. Though gas demand grows at 6.5%, its share remains limited. Electricity demand has doubled in the last decade and is expected to quadruple by 2020 and power generation grows at 5.4% annually. The fuel mix in power generation would remain predominantly coal-fired (two-thirds) with increasing shares of nuclear (at a growth rate of 9.6%) and hydro (at a growth rate of 5.5%).
East Asia: Average annual growth rate of commercial energy demand is expected to be 4.1%. Some countries would reduce their dependence on oil but would still constitute 50% of overall consumption. There would be an increase in the use of coal. Gas is to be favoured as a substitute for oil and its share would increase from 16% to 23% in 2020. Shares of nuclear and hydro would remain constant. Electricity demand is expected to grow at about 5% along with GDP.
South Asia: Average annual growth rate of commercial energy demand is expected to be 4.3% during the period. The share of coal falls significantly with gas being the fastest growing conventional source. Much of the demand for oil is from the transport sector. Electricity supply grows at 5% and is higher than the GDP growth rate. Per capita electricity remains low. The fuel mix in power generation would remain coal-fired, accounting for about two-thirds and hydro and gas accounting for one-third. Nuclear doubles but still contributes marginally.
Latin America: Average annual growth rate of commercial energy demand is expected to be 3.2%. Though the shares of oil and coal are expected to decline, the share of oil would be about 60% of the total commercial energy use in 2020. Much of the demand for oil is from the transport sector. Electricity supply grows at 4.1% and is higher than the GDP growth rate. The fuel mix in power generation would begin to depend on fossil-fuels primarily gas. This renewables-dependent region would continue to rely on hydro for one-third additional capacity. Nuclear increases marginally.
Africa: Average annual growth rate of commercial energy demand is expected to be 2.6%. The share of oil would remain a dominant source accounting for 56% of the total in 2020. Much of the demand for oil is from stationary sources. Share of coal is to decline and would be made up by gas. Electricity supply grows at 3.4%. The fuel mix in power generation would begin to depend on fossil-fuels, primarily gas, which grows more rapidly than coal or oil. The share of hydro falls and accounts for only 10% of the total generation. Nuclear capacity declines.
World Energy Council [8]
The WEC studies point towards a 55% increase in global energy consumption between 1998 and 2020. In terms of energy resource requirements this implies that:
• 90 mn barrels of oil could be consumed globally each day -an increase of 25 mbdor more than the entire current OPEC production today;
• Coal output could double to nearly 7 billion tonnes annually, or more than twice the UK's known coal reserves;
• Gas production could reach 4 trillion cubic metres, or almost as much as the USA's present gas reserves;
• More electricity generating capacity will probably have been built over the period 1990 and 2020 than was built in the previous century.
Developing countries, which today account for approximately 35% of global energy demand, will account for 50% by 2020, and for at least 70% by 2100.
The relative contribution of developing countries to climate change
While the share of developing countries in total global emissions will undoubtedly increase in the years to come, it is debatable as to when this group of countries would assume a larger responsibility in their contribution to the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere. The relative contribution of developed and developing countries to the problem of global warming reveals the following [9] :
• While the annual industrial emissions from developing countries reach those of industrialized nations by 2015, the stock contribution of the two groups will become equal in only 2055
• By including emissions from land use change and forestry (with DC's accounting for 77% of the build-up during 1850-1990) contributions equal in 2038
• By adjusting for population, contributions equal in 2100
Developing country initiatives in mitigating GHG emissions
The countries of the South have beleaguered the points on historic responsibility and their own need for development space. However, as Wallerstein says:
"I do not believe that there has ever been a time when these inequalities were unquestioned. That is to say, people or groups who have more have always felt the need to justify this fact, if for no other reason than to try to convince those who have less that they should accept this fact with relative docility".
That said, the key developing countries, albeit for strong domestic reasons, have undertaken several measures that have implications for the climate change problem.
Reid and Goldemberg [10] have provided detailed examples of actions being taken by the developing countries, in areas such as price reform and promotion of efficient and renewable energy, that have had a significant impact in terms of lowering of greenhouse gas emissions. They concluded that if the OECD countries had met the target specified in the Framework Convention of stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000 (which is definitely not achievable), a savings equivalent to about 4% of 1990 emissions would result. As against this, the measures listed above, already adopted by the key developing countries, would yield a savings representing 9% of their 1992 emission levels.
Driving forces for alternative development paths
If the countries of the South are to look for alternative development paths, transformations would be needed in the following key areas: population growth, level of social infrastructure, including education, and the level of economic growth. To focus on alternative sustainable development paths an additional set of key influencing factors include the patterns of consumption, access to more efficient technology, energy alternatives, adequate finances and the structure of new financial mechanisms such as the GEF and CDM.
Box 1 Selected country initiatives
China: China's emissions in 1997 were 50%, or more, lower than their potential emissions. This is due to a number of measures such as energy conservation, reduced subsidies, deployment of efficient energy production technologies, and bringing about structural changes in the economy. In addition, China's income elasticity of energy consumption is 0.41 much below that of other lowincome economies with an income elasticity of 1.61 [11] .
India: India has one of the largest renewable energy programs in the world. Although renewable energy technologies like biogas plants and improved cooking stoves have been available in India since the late 1940s, the renewable energy program started in earnest in 1982. Similarly, in the forestry sector, India has powerful legislation, which has made it difficult to divert forest lands to other uses.
Mexico: Mexico has developed national energy efficiency standards for new boilers, refrigerators, air conditioners, buildings and electric motors.
Brazil: The use of ethanol from sugar cane in automobiles in Brazil results in a reduction of 15% of its total emissions from fossil fuels annually.
South Africa: South Africa's commercial primary energy intensity is quite high and ranked 11th in the world. The electricity supply industry is undergoing changes with vertical unbundling and horizontal rationalization of distribution into separate regional utilities. It is expected that this would be subsequently followed by changes in regulation and governance. This would have implications for energy efficiency and demand side management [12] .
Population and social infrastructure
The population growth of developing countries is undoubtedly a problem, but more for domestic reasons, because of the pressure created on scarce resources -natural, physical and financial. Several authors have argued that population and population growth are among the key contributors to GHG emissions growth. The problem with such calculations is that consumption and population growth are averaged out among and within populations implying that everybody behaves identically [13] . Lutz goes on to argue that the world's population growth is most pronounced in regions like Africa and South Asia where commercial energy consumption levels are amongst the lowest in the world. Paul Harrison's [14] analysis reveals that population accounted for 35.6% of the annual CO2 emission growth between 1965 and 1989, while per capita consumption increases contributed 64.4%. Rahman et al. [15] have forcefully made the point that "Even immediate stabilization of world population would still result in a doubling of carbon dioxide in 30 years, if all people achieved US per capita consumption levels".
Having said that, a reduction in the growth of population in the developing countries, that today account for 80% of world population, is desirable as much for national level sustainability as for climate considerations. Ismail Serageldin [16, p.254 ] pointed out that a high fertility and young age structure characterized the developing country populations through the 1970s. The remarkable decline in mortality has even today not been accompanied by a corresponding decline in fertility. As a result, while the developed country population growth has remained stable at 0.7% over the period 1980-1997, the population growth rate in the low and middle income economies was 2% per annum between 1980-1990 and 1.6% between 1990-1997 [4] . The key to population control in developing countries lies in bringing down the fertility rate. Cautioning against the use of cultural variables as the sole explanatory factor, Schultz [17] concludes that "The relatively high levels of fertility in Islamic countries are explained here in terms of the underlying economic constraints on the population, including past educational investment in women".
Significantly, Nancy Birdsall [18] also concludes from an extensive review and analysis that "some combination of spending on family planning and girls' education in low income countries should be a central part of any optimal carbon reduction strategy". This far-sighted conclusion recognizes the strong interdependencies between containing population growth, literacy levels and the need to empower women in developing societies.
Income growth
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change recognizes the need for development of the developing countries. As stated in the Convention: "Recognizing that all countries, especially developing countries, need access to resources required to achieve sustainable social and economic development and that……their energy consumption will need to grow".
GNP per capita has actually declined in some developing regions or remains largely unchanged. The only distinct improvement is in the case of East Asia, which was emerging as a newly industrializing region. Even in this case, with the financial crisis, economic prospects have deteriorated [19] .
The OECD Secretariat projects economic growth of 0.1% in 1998 for Indonesia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Chinese Taipei compared to the 6.2 % in 1996. Republic of Korea is expected to contract in 1998 with a growth rate of -0.2% as compared to the rate of 7.1% in 1996. The implications of the financial crisis in these economies is that at best some economies may begin to recover in 1999 and others much later [20] .
Growth in GDP is an essential driver for achieving any success in efforts towards containing population growth or ensuring a higher literacy level of populations. Conversely, examining the theories that have attempted to explain the rapid growth in East Asia, Sarel [21] finds that the right 'initial conditions' were essential; the most important of which were strong investments in education and health, and reductions in inequality.
In order to sustain growth significantly large proportions of GDP need to be set aside for investment purposes. In the countries of the South, where a large share of the GDP goes towards meeting essential consumption needs, the challenge of growth, and hence development, is great. In sum, the developing countries would need external stimuli to get their economies moving in an accelerated fashion so that they can participate meaningfully in the climate change arena (and other global concerns), sooner than otherwise possible.
Table 3
Average annual percentage change (1975-1993) 1975-1993 1985-1995 Source: The World Bank [22, 23] 
GNP/Capita Region/Country Population

Financing development: sources and structures
While the Framework Convention recognizes the need for financial resources for achieving sustainable development in developing countries, Agenda 21 also states that the investment and domestic and external financial resources are essential to enable developing countries to achieve economic growth and ensure the well-being of its population. Financial flows to developing countries can take place in various forms. The main forms include Overseas Development Assistance, which includes grants and loans, and private flows including foreign direct investment and portfolio finance. Financial flows in 1996 reached US$ 284.6 billion representing a 184% increase since 1990 [24] . At the same time, the share of official development finance declined substantially from 56% to 14% in the same period. Disturbingly, in this changing pattern of financial flows, the share of short-term portfolio flows, which are inherently destabilizing in nature, is increasing and is also getting concentrated in a smaller number of countries [25] . Three-quarters of the private investment, it is stated, goes to just 10 countries because of their profitable trade and investment opportunities and prospects for economic growth.
Foreign direct investments have been made largely in Latin American and Caribbean (25%) and East Asia and the Pacific (60%). Obviously, there are very little financial flows into those countries that are not 'emerging markets' but need financial assistance desperately. Anderson also pointed out that the foreign assistance has probably done little to improve the living standard of the poor in recipient countries.
In addition to the above disparities, even sectoral disparities exist. The bulk of such assistance goes into the transport and energy sectors, which are essentially infrastructure sectors. Within the energy section, once again, there are huge disparities. It has been pointed out that of the World Bank's total portfolio 75% is devoted to oil, coal and gas and in nine out of 10 World Bank energy lending projects, G-7 based multinational corporations were among the beneficiaries of monies targeted for 'poverty alleviation' [26] .
While the above pattern of financial flows may still go some way in providing an investment stimulus to the higher end of the developing countries, the decline in development assistance, and the diversion of the already meagre levels of ODA towards climate solutions, bodes ill for the long-term development of developing countries. It needs to be stressed again that "economies are built -on a foundation of information, learning and adaptation". The Kyoto mechanisms hence can at best provide immediate or short-term solutions to the climate problem.
Technology improvements
The impact on climate change of alternative paths of development would also be influenced by the technology developments that one is able to integrate into the process. The technical paper on terms of transfer of technology and know-how [27] clearly highlights some of the key barriers to the transfer of environmentally sound technologies. Notable amongst these are the technological and informational barriers that are closely linked to social and economic development of countries. In particular, access to national and international sources of financing is seen as a major obstacle.
The technology transfer not supported by requisite adaptation could very easily result in a failure of the process. At the same time, most technology transfer is viewed to take place from countries of the North to the countries of the South. This invariably implies a quantum jump in the level of technology application, which highlights the weaknesses in the developing countries' ability to receive the technology. Opportunities for South-South technology cooperation could be explored equally rigorously as the appropriateness and adaptation requirements would be stronger in such cases.
The flip side of the coin is that the technological change that is taking place is raising the demand for skilled labour relative to unskilled labour [19] . The report goes on to stress the need for governments to upgrade their higher education. Obviously, a successful technology transfer initiative would depend as much on building up the technical capacity of the population at large, if one is not to exclude the uneducated/unskilled from the process of development, as it would on the access to technology and finance.
According to OECD estimates, 77% of the technology transferred to DC's is through foreign trade. In 1988, developing countries spent $144 billion on imports of technological goods & services, including payments for licensing fees and royalties, in comparison with $13 billion received via ODA and $29 billion through FDI.
There is empirical evidence that the Restrictive Business Practice (RBP) of the private sector to monopolize EST hinders the dissemination and development of ESTs. Even for ESTs of global importance, such as non-ODS, private sector dominance can block the development or cheap availability of ESTs [28] .
Korean experience: One Korean company's attempt to license non-ODS substances was refused and Korea faced fierce blocking moves by the major firms of ICs which registered all relevant patents in Korea. It took six years and more than $12million for Korea to develop its own technology for HVFC-22 and HFC-134a. These were excluded from technical assistance under the Montreal Protocol [28] .
Conclusions
In sum, the authors emphasize in this paper that while the emissions of GHGs from developing countries will surely grow, their ability to contain these emissions is limited by several factors. In an effort to address their developmental needs, countries of the South are already implementing a number of policies and measures that are lowering their emissions growth path. However, a truly long-term solution to both reduced emissions from developing countries, as well as their participation in the global efforts to reduce adverse climatic impacts, would be to invest in raising the level of social and economic infrastructure in these countries.
More direct solutions aimed primarily at reducing the emissions of GHGs, without elevating the social base of the developing countries, would have short-term projectspecific benefits and high recurring transaction costs to keep these projects in a state of technological catch-up. Capacity building related to technology transfer would benefit a very small fraction of the populations of these countries and would be project or activity specific. Similarly, the type of financial flows and the direction of such flows would have to be affected in such a manner as to ensure long-term benefits. Mechanisms such as the CDM, JI, and GEF would again have direct micro impacts that would fade away with the project life. Such mechanisms would be useful only if additional to a floor level of development assistance that targets the building up of the social infrastructure in the countries of the South. Under no circumstances would a diversion of development funds to mitigation project activities or replacement of ODA funds with private funds result in the long-term solution that is called for by the nature of the climate change problem.
